

# Top 3 Cyber Risk Reductions Your HTM Team Can Start Today

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# Introductions



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How is healthcare impacted?

707
Data Breaches

51.9 million
individual
records

2022 Healthcare Statistics



Source: Healthcare Data Breach Statistics, HIPAA Journal, Feb. 2023

# Cybersecurity for Network Capable Medical Devices

### **Biomed**

- ➤ Patient Monitors
- >IV Pumps
- **≻** Laboratory
- ➤ Ventilators
- ➤ Anesthesia Machines
- ➤ Defibrillators
- ➤ Cath Lab Physiological Monitoring
- **≻**EEG/EMG
- Etc.

### **Imaging**

- >CT Scanner
- > MRI
- ➤ Fluoro (Cath Lab and ED)
- ➤ Ultrasound
- > C-Arms
- **≻**Mammography
- Etc.




### **How Ransomware Works**







## Impact of Ransomware on Patient Care



Reported **longer** lengths of stay



Reported an increase in patient transfers or facility diversions



Reported an impact on mortality rates




Source: The Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022, IBM, Jul. 2022

Source: The Impact of Ransomware Patient Safety and the Value of Cybersecurity Benchmarking, Ponemon Institute, Jan. 2023

# Frameworks and Resources

A survey of 579 IT and IT security professionals in healthcare delivery organizations (HDOs) on "What are the top standards, frameworks or industry practices currently used or plan to use as the basis for its cybersecurity program?"



Source: The Impact of Ransomware Patient Safety and the Value of Cybersecurity Benchmarking, Ponemon Institute, Jan. 2023



### **Other Problems We Face?**

### The problem with HTM Programs

- HTM is historically underfunded and often does not have dedicated Cyber staff
- Pressured to support more equipment and more facilities with the same HTM staff
- Very tight project and inspection timelines combined with overwhelming PM lists

### Why Cybersecurity is hard

- Overwhelming number of cybersecurity standards and recommendations
- Visibility and availability of equipment is a challenge
- More vulnerabilities than time to manage
- Thousands of manufacturers and models that each have different cybersecurity capabilities and standards




### Where do we start?





### 1 Identify <u>Inventory</u> network data elements

- Know what is in your environment
  - Network Capable?
- Document all network data





# 1 Identify Inventory and <u>Capabilities</u>

- Patient data storage
- Network capabilities
- Password protection
- Data encryption
- Virus/Malware protection

|  | _  | _  |   |                       |                                 |        |
|--|--|--|---|-----------------------|---------------------------------|--------|
| Device Category  |  | Manufacturer   | Document ID Do  | cument Release D      | ate                             |        |
| 18360 Recorders, Electronic  |  | GE Healthcare  | DOC2002784 JU   | JUN-2017              |                                 | - 1    |
| Storage, Data, Electrocardiography   |  |  | i   | į                     |                                 |        |
| Device Model   |  | Software Revision  |   | Software Release Date |                                 |        |
| MAC 5500   |  | 9A, 9A.1, 9B, 9B.1, 9C, 9D   |   | 9/23/2013 (9D)        |                                 |        |
| Refer to Section 2.3.2 of this standard for the proper interpretation of information requested in this form. |  |  |   |                       | Yes, No,<br>N/A, or<br>See Note | Note # |
| 10   | MALWARE DETECTION/PR   | OTECTION (MLDP)  |   |                       |                                 |        |
|  | The ability of the device to eff   | fectively prevent, detect and ren                                  | nove malicious software (malware).                                |                       |                                 |        |
| 10-1   | 10-1 Does the device support the use of anti-malware software (or other anti-malware mechanism)?                               |  |   |                       |                                 |        |
|  | 10-1.1 Can the user independently re-configure anti-malware settings?  |  |   |                       |                                 |        |
|  | 10-1.2 Does notification of malware detection occur in the device user interface?  |  |   |                       |                                 |        |
|  | 10-1.3 Can only manufacturer-authorized persons repair systems when malware has been detected?                                 |  |   |                       | N/A                             | _      |
| 10-2   | Can the device owner install of  | or update anti-virus software?                                     |   |                       | No                              |        |
| 10-3   | Can the device owner/operator (technically/physically) update virus definitions on manufacturer-installed anti-virus software? |  | lled anti-virus   | No                    | -                               |        |
| MLDP<br>notes:   |  |  |   |                       |                                 |        |
| 11   | NODE AUTHENTICATION (N   | NAUT)  |   |                       |                                 | $\neg$ |
|  | The ability of the device to au  | thenticate communication partn                                     | ers/nodes.  |                       |                                 |        |
| 11-1   |  | port any means of node authent<br>and are authorized to receive tr | cation that assures both the sender and<br>ansferred information? | the recipient of      | No                              | -      |



### **Prioritization of Devices and Risks**

### **Business Criticality**

Life Critical
Devices
Network Connected

A

Business
Critical Devices
Network Connected

Regulatory Data (ePHI) Devices Network Connected

Normal Criticality
Devices


A security compromise presents risk of **serious injury** to patient or staff/

A security compromise presents risk of **serious disruption** to patient care operations such as diversion or cancellation of critical care.

A security compromise presents serious **regulatory risk** such as HIPAA, PCI or SOX.


Any equipment for which compromise does not present risk to safety, operational or regulatory requirements.

### **Patient Safety**





### **Prioritization of Devices and Risks**






2

# Prioritization of Devices and Risks

www.cvedetails.com



### **Prioritization of Devices and Risks**

## Common Vulnerability Scoring System

CVSS v3.0 Ratings

Critical 9.0-10.0

High 7.0-8.9

Medium 4.0-6.9

Low 0.1-3.9

None 0.0

## **Exploit Prediction Scoring System**

EPSS v2 Probabilities

Critical 75-100%

High 50-74%

Medium 20-49%

Low 0.1-19%

None 0.0%



### **Operating System Patching**

### **OS Patching Windows devices**

- What devices can have patches auto update?
- What devices can have patches pushed remotely?

| 5   | CYBER SECURITY PRODUCT UPGRADES (CSUP)   |     |   |  |  |  |
|-----|--|-----|---|--|--|--|
|     | The ability of on-site service staff, remote service staff, or authorized customer staff to install/upgrade device's security patches. |     |   |  |  |  |
|     |  |     |   |  |  |  |
| 5-1 | Can relevant OS and device security patches be applied to the device as they become available?   | Yes | 1 |  |  |  |
|     | 5-1.1 Can security patches or other software be installed remotely?  | Yes | 2 |  |  |  |

| Device Operating System (OS)   |       | Windows 7 Professional 32 or 64 bit      |  |  |  |
|--|-------|--|--|--|--|
| Can the OS be automatically patched?   | ✓ Yes | □No                                      |  |  |  |
| **Note that systems that do not support automated patching via the VHA MD Update Server or via vendor channels |       |  |  |  |  |
| impose a significantly higher risk to the VA network.  |       |  |  |  |  |
| If patching is not automated, what is the patching process and/or limitations?                                 |       | Please see GeneXpert Security Guidelines |  |  |  |




### Prioritization of **Devices** for Patching

### **Include Patching in Other Services**

- Does your existing contract include patching?
- Can patching be added to time and material devices a vendor maintains?
- Can patching be added to in house PM's?

### **Business Criticality**





# Summary

1

# **Identify and Inventory Capabilities**

- Document network data
- Explore cyber capabilities

2

#### Prioritization of Devices and Risks

- Balance Business
   Criticality with Patient

   Risks
- Understand how to read and prioritize vulnerabilities

3

# **Operating System Patching**

- Automate patching when safe and able
- Optimize patching efforts with clear guidance
- Include patching in existing services



# Sodexo HTM Cybersecurity Overview

### Operationalize Your Cybersecurity Program with an HTM Expert

Cybersecurity is a growing and costly risk for healthcare facilities, one that directly impacts hospitals and patient care. Choosing a flexible HTM cybersecurity program based on a deep understanding of your organizational goals prioritizes integrations, data collection and vulnerability management.



Device patch management and hardening



Collection of over 22 critical data elements



Robust risk assessment based on 25 model specific risk factors



Vulnerability scanning and assessment based on real-world exploitation



1,100+ MDS2 data sheets, and growing



55 points of alignment with the NIST Cybersecurity



KPIs and scheduled reporting



Partnership with multiple healthcare cybersecurity industry leaders



# **Questions?**



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Please scan QR code to submit a survey for this session.

**Thank You!**